What Qatar appears to have understood earlier than most governments is that power in the United States is not shaped only in Washington. It is shaped years earlier, in classrooms, syllabi, research centers, and the quiet assumptions absorbed by students before they ever vote, work in government, or enter media. Public records filed under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act show that Qatar has sent at least $6.6 billion in gifts and contracts to American universities, spread across 1,223 disclosed transactions. No other country comes close. Germany, Britain, China, Canada, and Saudi Arabia each sit near $4 billion. Over decades, foreign funding to U.S. higher education exceeds $62 billion. Qatar is not an outlier by accident. It is an outlier by design.

The money did not scatter. It flowed into a small group of elite institutions that agreed to build permanent satellite campuses in Doha’s Education City, a state run project intended to import American academic prestige while exporting Qatari influence. Cornell alone received $2.3 billion. Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar has taken in more than $1 billion since 2005. Texas A and M received $696 million. Northwestern took roughly $500 to $600 million. Carnegie Mellon received up to $500 million. Virginia Commonwealth University received more than $100 million. These funds are largely structured as long term contracts that cover construction, salaries, tuition, and research. Qatar does not simply donate. It underwrites operations. Shared faculty, joint research, and institutional dependence follow naturally. Influence does not need instructions when incentives are aligned.

Scrutiny intensified as campus climates shifted. Reports from the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy and the Network Contagion Research Institute found correlations between Qatari funding and higher rates of antisemitic and anti Israel incidents, particularly within Middle East studies programs. Congressional testimony in 2024 and 2025 framed the funding as part of a broader effort to shape academic discourse rather than merely support education. University administrators and Qatari officials reject the charge, insisting the funding is transparent and lawful. Others argue the correlations do not prove causation. Still, the pattern has drawn attention because Qatar hosts Hamas leaders, backs Muslim Brotherhood aligned networks, and rarely funds programs that examine its own record on terrorism financing or political repression.

Some investigators say even the disclosed numbers tell only part of the story. Charles Small, who has spent years tracking Islamist influence networks, says his team identified more than $100 billion in undocumented Qatari funds flowing into American universities through opaque channels. He claims Cornell received closer to $10 billion and Texas A and M more than $1.3 billion. At Brown University, he points to a $1 billion grant tied to the Choices Program, which produces curriculum for more than 8,000 schools nationwide. Small argues these materials erase Jewish and Christian history in the Middle East while promoting narratives aligned with Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Qatar, he says, did not just build campuses. It built pipelines into how Americans are taught to understand history, identity, and power.

What makes the story more striking is the contrast with Washington’s public posture. Even as concerns grow over Qatar’s footprint in American academia, the administration continues to highlight major defense deals, arms sales, and diplomatic cooperation with Doha, presenting Qatar as a central U.S. partner in the region. Those announcements rarely acknowledge universities, curricula, or long term influence. The two conversations run in parallel and almost never meet.

Inside the administration, officials do not appear to agree on what Qatar represents. One camp views Doha as a useful ally with money, access, and regional leverage that Washington is reluctant to jeopardize. Another sees a state that hosts Hamas leaders, finances Muslim Brotherhood aligned networks, and embeds itself quietly inside institutions that shape future policymakers, journalists, and educators. The contradiction is managed rather than resolved. Qatar can be framed simultaneously as a strategic partner and a source of deep unease, depending on the room. That unresolved tension now sits at the center of the debate over whether foreign funding in American universities is merely soft power or something far more consequential.

Israel Has The Green Light For Lebanon Operation

What is unfolding between Israel, the United States, and Lebanon is less a sudden crisis than the exposure of a long running private calculation. According to Israeli officials familiar with recent cabinet discussions, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told ministers that President Donald Trump has effectively removed the last political restraints on Israeli action in Lebanon if Hezbollah refuses to disarm. There has been no public confirmation from Washington, which is typical. In this arena, assurances are rarely formal. They are conveyed quietly, understood clearly, and denied later if necessary. Israel’s military, officials say, has been operating on the assumption that political cover already exists.

Against this backdrop, the Lebanese Army has moved to present itself as acting. It announced that it had completed the first phase of a plan to place all weapons under state authority, following a cabinet decision on August 5, 2025, and said it had expanded deployments south of the Litani River. Israeli officials are not persuaded. Israel’s Channel 12 quoted defense sources saying Hezbollah continues to operate freely in the area despite the army’s claims. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office struck a similar tone, calling Lebanon’s efforts commendable but insufficient, saying Hezbollah remains armed and is actively trying to regroup. In Jerusalem, these statements are not seen as contradictions but as confirmation of the core assessment. The Lebanese state is doing just enough to show cooperation. Hezbollah is doing nothing of the sort. From Israel’s perspective, that gap is precisely where war becomes not only possible, but increasingly inevitable.

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi landed in Beirut for talks with Lebanese leaders. Upon arrival, he made clear that Tehran is prepared for multiple scenarios unfolding in the region.

"We are fully prepared for any situation," Araghchi said.

"We do not want war but we are ready for war, and we are also ready for negotiations based on mutual interests and respect. Whenever the Americans accept that negotiation is different from dictation, a meaningful negotiation can begin."

The visit comes as tensions escalate across multiple fronts. Israel has reportedly received a "green light" from the Trump administration to strike Hezbollah in Lebanon if the group refuses to disarm. Iran, meanwhile, has been signaling its own readiness for preemptive action and coordinating with regional allies like the Houthis. Araghchi's presence in Beirut signals Tehran's intent to shore up its closest ally in the region at a critical moment.

His statement reflects Iran's dual-track approach: projecting military readiness while keeping the door open for diplomacy, though on terms that recognize Iran as an equal negotiating partner rather than a party being dictated to by Washington.

A U.S.-backed framework for postwar Gaza is under discussion, shaped by consultations between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu and linked to the second phase of the ceasefire process. The concept prioritizes an initial pilot reconstruction effort in southern Gaza, beginning around Rafah, before any wider redevelopment is considered.

Current discussions focus on launching early works inside areas of southern Gaza under Israeli security control. Officials have informally referred to the pilot zone as Green Rafah or New Rafah. The stated objective is to clear rubble, neutralize unexploded ordnance and remaining militant infrastructure, and establish limited livable zones that could serve as a proof of concept for broader rebuilding across the Strip.

From a security standpoint, Israel maintains control over two critical corridors. The Philadelphi Corridor runs along the Egypt border and is intended to block weapons smuggling and cross-border rearmament. The Netzarim Corridor cuts east to west across Gaza and is designed to limit militant movement and logistical recovery. Together, these corridors divide the territory and give Israel effective security control over roughly 53 percent of Gaza under the current ceasefire arrangements.

Reconstruction is explicitly tied to security benchmarks. Progress is conditioned on Hamas disarmament or at minimum the removal of its military capabilities from designated zones, as well as continued steps on hostage releases. Any reopening of the Rafah crossing is expected to be linked to these developments rather than granted automatically.

Maps shown in briefings depict Israeli security control extending behind a marked line inland from Rafah, with the remaining populated areas stretching toward the Mediterranean. The concept envisions new civilian zones described as New Gaza or Green Rafah that would operate without Hamas military infrastructure and without a permanent Israeli military presence inside the city itself. These areas are described as demilitarized civilian zones designed to attract residents seeking stability and services.

Israeli authorities have reportedly undertaken extensive debris clearance in parts of southern Gaza at U.S. request, though no official percentage figures have been publicly verified. Claims of mass population transfers to New Gaza during the second phase of the ceasefire have not been formally confirmed by Israel, the U.S., or international mediators.

Longer-term proposals circulated by figures close to Trump describe a multibillion-dollar redevelopment vision for Gaza, beginning in the south and expanding northward if security conditions allow. These concepts emphasize civilian governance, economic infrastructure, housing and services without militant or foreign military presence inside the rebuilt areas. Officials stress that these are strategic outlines rather than approved blueprints.

The framework remains tied to security conditions and hostage releases rather than operating as a standalone humanitarian initiative. Whether the Green Rafah model succeeds as a pilot will likely determine whether broader reconstruction proceeds across the rest of Gaza.